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This paper reports experimental evidence on behaviour in an Ultimatum Game where responders have low
structural information and feedback so that they have to learn the nature of the game during repeated play.
The results lend support to the view that certain learning conditions are less favourable in terms of
individual outcomes than others as suggested by the contingent learning approach (Slembeck, 1998a).
Furthermore, there is evidence that proposers behave “less fair” when responders lack structural
information, which contrasts with common notions of fairness or “manners” in ultimatum bargaining
(Camerer and Thaler 1995).
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2See eg., ROTH AND MURNIGHAN (1982), MITZKEWITZ AND NAGEL (1993), CROSON (1996), RAPOPORT AND
SUNDALI (1996), KAGEL, KIM AND MOSER (1996). An overview of ultimatum bargaining with complete and
incomplete information can be found in SLEMBECK (1998b).
3The experiment by ROTH AND MURNIGHAN (1982) is an exception. They find that the frequency of agreement in
their bargaining game depends on whether it is common knowledge what information the bargainers possess (see
ROTH (1995b) for details and discussion).
1. Introduction
In economics, subjects have traditionally been assumed to act in environments that provide ideal
conditions for decision making and learning. This paper reports experimental evidence on how
people behave in less than ideal conditions for the case of the well-known Ultimatum Game. In
the standard version of the game, two players bargain over a fixed amount called the pie. The
first player (the proposer) proposes how to split the pie between him and a second player (the
responder) who then has the opportunity to accept or reject the proposed split. If it is accepted,
both players get their agreed share. If it is rejected, both players receive nothing. Under the
assumption that players aim to maximize their own incomes, the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium is that the proposer offers the smallest possible amount and responders accept every
positive offer. A great number of experiments, however, has demonstrated that most
experimental subjects do not accept offers of less than about 40% of the pie (see ROTH, 1995a,
for an overview of the experimental literature). This result has been interpreted by the players’
concern for “fairness” with regard to the split of the pie (see CAMERER AND THALER, 1995, for
a discussion). In order to make the game more realistic and to study whether “fairness” is
sensitive to the information provided, the game has been investigated experimentally for the
case where players have asymmetric information about the size of the pie.
2 However, it is a
common feature of this literature that players know the structure of the game. Also, the players
usually have common knowledge about the informational asymmetry.
3
The present paper looks at a more drastic, but sometimes more realistic case where players
do not know the structure of the game, but have to learn optimal play under two feedback
conditions, one of which allows to learn the structure of the game, while the other condition
prevents from doing so. It is the aim of this study to explore how people learn to play the
Ultimatum Game under low information conditions. The main interest is on learning behaviour
and the role of learning determinants as described in the contingent learning approach by
SLEMBECK (1998a). In addition, the study sheds new light on the role of fairness in ultimatum
bargaining in that there is experimental evidence that proposers behave “less fair” when
responders lack structural information. The idea and motivation for studying games of low
information is outlined next in Section 2. Section 3 describes design, hypotheses, and
procedures of the experiment. The results are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.– 3 –
4See MATSUSHIMA (1997) for a similar critique. – KALAI AND LEHRER (1995, 124) define a complete model as each
player having complete detailed information about the identity of his opponent, their feasible sets, information
structures, utilities, and so forth.
5The casual story for this game is that two commuters travel on the same train every day. They always sit in
adjacent compartments, both of which are uncomfortably cold. Each compartment has a lever marked “heater”, but
there is no indication at to whether it should be turned to the left or to the right to increase the temperature. What
the commuters do not know is that there is a fault in the electrical wiring of the train: moving either lever to the left
increases the temperature (option a) and moving either lever to the right decreases the temperature (option b) in the
adjacent compartment. Although the commuters cannot influence their own comfort directly, they would both
benefit, if they turned their levers to the left at the beginning of each journey (COLEMAN ET AL., 1990). – With
regard to an economic application, one may think of some activity that can be done in two different ways, both of
which leave the payoffs for the actor unaffected, but one of which has positive external effects on others that are
not know to the actor herself.
ab
a  1 , 1 0 , 1
b  1 , 0 0 , 0
Figure 1: The “Mutual Fate Control” Payoff Matrix
 of the Minimal Social Situation
2. Low Information Games
There are several reasons to study games where the model of the situation is incompletely
known to the players. As KALAI AND LEHRER (1995) have pointed out, the assumption of a
“complete model” may be unrealistic and too demanding even for highly rational players
engaged in moderate size problems for many applications.
4 Hence, in real life situations, players
are usually not endowed with payoff matrices or game trees so that they have to learn the
structure that links behaviours to outcomes. Sometimes real-life players may even be unaware
that they are actually playing a game.
This extreme case has been studied in psychology where a minimal social situation is
defined as a situation where the payoffs of two persons are determined by each other’s
behaviour, but both are oblivious of their interdependence (SIDOWSKI ET AL., 1956). When only
two behavioural options (a and b) are available, the outcomes are determined by a simple payoff
matrix – called “mutual fate control” by THIBAUT AND KELLEY (1959) – as shown in Figure 1.
In this situation a person can only influence the payoff for the other person, but not for herself.
Psychologists were interested whether people are able to coordinate on (a , a) for the case that
they do not know the payoff matrix, and given that they do not even know that they are in an
interdependent situation.
5 To this end, the minimal social situation has been studied in a large
number of experiments. The results show that subjects are able to coordinate on (a , a), provided
that they play repeatedly against the same opponent many times. That is, people eventually learn– 4 –
6Simple reinforcement learning (see BUSH AND MOSTELLER (1955) for a formal model) is merely an application of
THORNDIKE’S (1911) law of effect that can be interpreted as a “win-stay, lose-change” strategy for repeated play.
Applying this strategy to the minimal social situation yields one of the following sequences: (i) if both players start
by playing a: (a , a), (a , a), (a , a), (a , a)....; (ii) if both players start by playing b:  (b, b), (a , a), (a , a),  (a , a)...;
(iii) if one player starts by playing a and the other by playing b: (a , b), (b, b), (a , a), (a , a).... or (b , a), (b , b), (a
, a), (a , a).... – ROTH AND EREV (1995), EREV AND ROTH (1998) have adopted a modified version of reinforcement
learning in the context of game theory (see also BÖRGERS AND SARIN, 1997).
to play strategy a, given favourable learning conditions. In the psychology literature, this
observation is explained by reinforcement learning which simply assumes that players adopt the
strategy that yielded high payoffs in the past and avoid strategies that yielded low payoffs (see
COLEMAN ET AL., 1990, who provide a multiperson generalization of the minimal social
situation and references to empirical work).
6
In the view of traditional game theory, the minimal social situation is not really a game,
since a game is defined as a situation of strategic interdependence. Because the involved
individuals are not aware of their factual interdependence, the situation is not strategic to them,
and, hence, there is no reason for them to think about their own behaviour in terms the
behaviour of others, i.e., they have no incentive to behave strategically. Therefore, the minimal
social situation lacks the element of strategy that is fundamental to the traditional game theoretic
definition.
Informing individuals that outcomes are not only determined by their own behaviour, but
also by the behaviour of others – however, withholding information about the actual structure
that links actions to outcomes – turns the situation into what may be called a game of low
information. In such a game, players may aim to take the behaviour of others into account in
their own choices, but since they suffer from deficient structural information, players not only
have to learn about the behaviour of other players, but also about the underlying structure.
Hence, players must form beliefs about the structure of the game and about the behaviour of
others from experience.
From the viewpoint of a single decision maker this situation is know as a multi-armed
bandit problem in the economic literature (see e.g., ROTHSCHILD, 1974). More recently, GILBOA
AND SCHMEIDLER (1996) have proposed a case-based optimisation model where a decision
maker is unaware of the payoff distributions corresponding to the available options, but learns
to optimise from past experience. In the context of games, KALAI AND LEHRER (1995) have
outlined a theory of subjective games and equilibria, where players do not know the payoff
structure, but face a multi-person, multi-armed bandit game. Players are modelled to use an
“environment response function” that compresses all payoff relevant uncertainties of the game
into a one person decision problem, and allows them to assign a probability distribution for all
arms of the bandit based on the history of play (see also MATSUSHIMA, 1997). – 5 –
7The most obvious case are theories based on rational expectations where economic actors are assumed to already
have learned everything relevant. The view that economics traditionally has focused on steady states of some
unspecified adaptive process is defended in LUCAS (1987) and has been criticized, among others, by WINTER
(1987). The importance of appropriate conditions for learning has been stressed, e.g., by TVERSKY AND
KAHNEMAN (1987).
Based on evidence from individual decision making, SLEMBECK (1998a) has outlined a
general theory of learning determinants where the influence of situational restrictions on
learning is analysed qualitatively. This contingent learning approach focuses on the role of such
restrictions in situations that provide imperfect conditions for learning, especially with respect
to the available information. Among other learning determinants, the approach stresses the
importance of quality, quantity and content of feedback when information about the structure of
the game, e.g., the payoff structure, is missing or deficient. The example of the minimal social
situation illustrates this importance nicely.
In sum, there are several reasons for studying situations or games of low information. First,
such situations may be more realistic and, therefore, be more relevant for actual economic
behaviour for many applications. Explorative studies can be useful especially when there is no
sound theory available, and understanding how people behave when they have little information
may enrich economic theory in important ways. Second, as the example of the minimal social
situation demonstrates, people are able to cope with such situations given appropriate conditions
for learning. Thus, it may be worthwhile to study such situations with respect to human learning
(see e.g. NORTH, 1996), especially since economics has traditionally assumed ideal conditions
for learning that are unlikely to be met in real life situations.
7 When interested in learning or
adaption processes, a natural research strategy, therefore, is to study situations of less-than-ideal
learning conditions.
  With respect to the Ultimatum Game, a situation of low information has been studied
experimentally, e.g., in SLEMBECK (1998b). While the proposers had complete information
about the game, the responders did not exactly know what kind of situation they were involved
in (low information condition). The situation was labelled as an experiment in decision making.
Responders were presented amounts they could either accept or reject, and were told that these
amounts were the results of decisions made by other participants in other rooms. They also
knew that they would receive the amount, if they accepted and get nothing if they rejected. – For
this case, theory predicts that every positive amount is accepted, and the same holds for fairness
theories since “fairness” is not an issue for low information responders who do not know that
they are playing an Ultimatum Game. Evidence from this experiment is, however, that many
responders under low information did not accept all positive amounts; in fact, they rejected
offers more frequently than an other group of responders that had complete information. To– 6 –
explore this finding more deeply, the present paper looks at a somewhat less extreme case as
explained in the next Section.
3. Experiment
Hypotheses and Design
The present experiment is designed to test two simple hypothesis of the contingent learning
approach (CLA, henceforth). The first hypothesis simply claims that lacking information about
the structure of the situation or game impedes players from optimal play. Hence, for the case of
low structural information, players are hypothesized to be worse off compared to the case of
complete information. In the experiment this idea is implemented by having responders face a
two-armed bandit problem where one arm represents accepting the offer, while the other means
rejecting it. Furthermore, information for responders is also “low” in the sense that they do not
see any amount before choosing an arm.
The second hypothesis in question claims that learning is influenced by quality, quantity and
content of feedback. More specifically, learning is fostered the more the content of feedback
reveals about the underlying structure of the game. Hence, lacking structural information can, to
some extent, be substituted by feedback. In the experiment this idea was implemented by giving
one group of responders (under low structural information) only feedback concerning the
outcomes of their own choices, while responders of an other group (also under low structural
information) received also feedback about the outcome for the other player. The behaviour of
both groups was compared to a control group that played under standard conditions with
complete information and feedback. The information conditions of responders are summarized
in Table 1.
structural information feedback
player’s own payoff opponent’s payoff
Treatment 1 low: 2-armed bandit yes no
Treatment 2 low: 2-armed bandit yes yes
Control Group complete yes yes
Table 1: Information Conditions of Responders
Responders in T1 and T2 knew that they were involved in a two-person game that would be
repeated twenty times. They also knew (i) that there were two types of players, (ii) that they– 7 –
8Although playing repeatedly against the same opponent may have made learning more efficient for responders –
as the results from experiments on the minimal social situation suggest –, the traditional rotation matching scheme
was maintained in order to make the results comparable to previous work. Repeated ultimatum bargaining with
fixed opponents has been investigated in SLEMBECK (1999) where reputation effects are shown to be behaviourally
relevant.
9Recall that consideration of fairness are often assumed to be the source of rejections in the literature on ultimatum
bargaining under complete information (see CAMERER AND THALER, 1995).
themselves were player 2, and (iii) that they would be matched with a new player each round.
8
In all three groups proposers had complete information about the game, and, therefore, knew the
information conditions of their opponents. The instructions to the subjects are shown in the
Appendix.
As for play under complete information, theory predicts that proposers make minimal offers
and responders accept every offer. This prediction may hold even more for responders under
low information since they face a two-armed bandit where one arm always yields some positive
payoff, while the other always returns a payoff of zero. Since responders do not know that they
are actually playing an Ultimatum Game, they may be assumed not to reject offers out of
fairness considerations,
9 especially because they do not see any amount before choosing an arm.
Of course, since the arms are not connected to any meaning ex ante, players first have to learn
the consequences that the two arms yield, so that rejections are likely to occur in the beginning.
But after having learned these consequences rational players are assumed to choose exclusively
one arm, namely the one which yields a positive payoff so that rejection rates converge to zero.
This type of reasoning clearly holds for responders in Treatment 1 (low feedback condition).
However, responders in Treatment 2 may learn about the structure of the game, because they
receive also feedback about the consequences of their own decision for player 1 (high feedback
condition). Hence, not much reasoning is required for responders under this condition to learn
that any positive amount they receive and any positive amount their opponent receives sums up
to a constant. With regard to the content of feedback CLA predicts that play under high
feedback (T2) is more in accordance with standard play (control group) than under low feedback
(T1), while standard theory does not predict any behavioural differences between the three
conditions after low information responders have learned the functions of the two options
available to them.
The present design also allows to gain evidence on the role of fairness in ultimatum
bargaining from responder behaviour. Note that if proposers care about fairness regardless of the
information of the responders as the hypothesis of fairness as altruistic impulse suggests
(“trying to be fair”, KAGEL ET AL., 1996), proposer behaviour should not differ between the
three conditions (control group, T1 and T2). Furthermore, if players care about equitable
outcomes in the context of a particular interaction, as CAMERER AND THALER (1995) have– 8 –
suggested, it is unclear why proposers should ask for a significantly larger share of the pie for
themselves when facing uninformed responders, as the results of the present experiment
indicate. This would seem at odds with the notion of “manners” that has been stressed by
Camerer and Thaler, as will be discussed in Section 4.
Experimental Procedures
A total of 100 students from a large university in the United Kingdom took part in the
treatments reported in this paper. 20 experimental subjects were randomly allocated to the
control group and 40 more subjects were randomly assigned to each of the two treatment
groups. Each subject played 20 rounds of the Ultimatum Game on networked computers, always
in the role of a responder or proposer as assigned at the beginning of a session at random.
Instructions were given on computer screens (see Appendix) and participants were allowed to
ask questions after reading the instructions. During the sessions, participants could not see each
other and the only communication was via computers according to the following rules.
Each round a pie of £10 was to be divided in that proposers had to decide the share (called
offer) they wanted to allocate to responder. Offers were allowed to range between £0.10 and
£9.90 in increments of £0.10.
•In the control group, offers were displayed on the screens of responders before they could
choose to accept or reject the offer by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard.
Feedback concerning the responders’ choice was given to proposers and the payoffs for each
round were displayed on the screens of both players. This is a standard procedure in
ultimatum bargaining (see player screens in the Appendix).
•In Treatments 1 and 2 responders were presented two neurally labelled options to choose
from, i.e. a “left” and a “right” key on the keyboard. After choosing and confirming the
choice, a feedback screen displayed the choice again together with the payoff for the
responder in that round. In addition to this information the responders’ feedback screen in
T2 also showed the amount the proposer received. This was the only difference between T1
and T2 (see player screens in the Appendix).
In both treatments, for exactly half of the responders, the “left” key corresponded to accepting
an offer, while the “right” key had the function of rejecting the offer. For the other half the
function of the keys was reversed in order to control for a potential bias with respect to choosing
left or right keys. Of course, this information was not given to the subjects. However, they knew
that they were matched with a new player each round.  At the end of the session, two rounds
were randomly chosen by the computer, and participants were paid in cash according to the
actual outcome in those rounds. A show-up fee of £5 was added to the final payments. This
procedure was described in the instructions (see Appendix).– 9 –
10The proposers‘ first mover advantage (fma) as shown in Table 2 was calculated in the following way:
 with e(p), e(r) being the total earnings over all rounds of proposers and responders fma =
- e(p) e(r)
P
respectively; 9 is the total size of the pie. – Put differently, in T1 and T2 proposers earned £126 and £97
respectively while proposers in the control group earned only £78 on average per subject over all rounds.
Responders earned £35 in T1, and £34 in T2, but £68 in the control group. Thus, proposers earned 3.6 times the
income of proposers in T1, and 2.9 times in T2, but only about 1.1 times in the control group.




mean offer 4.21£ 2.25£ 2.59£
modal offer 5.00£ 0.10£ 0.10£
median offer 4.00£ 2.00£ 2.05£
rejection rate 26.5% 19.3% 34.8%
proposer advantage 5.1% 45.7% 31.7%
Table 2: Overview of Main Results
4. Experimental Results
The results for the control group are similar to those from other studies under complete
information (see SLONIM AND ROTH (1998) for a recent overview of typical results). The mean
offer is £4.21, with a mode of £5.00 and a median of £4.00. In contrast, Treatments 1 and 2
show distinctly different proposer behaviour in that offers are much lower in terms of means,
modes, and medians (see Table 2).
With regard to responder behaviour, Table 2 shows that rejections are less frequent in T1
(19.3%), but much more frequent in T2 (34.8%), compared to the control group (26.5%). The
most striking difference, however, is found in the so-called proposers’ first-mover advantage.
10
In the literature, this term is used to describe the finding that responders in ultimatum
experiments under complete information accept splits that are somewhat less than fifty-fifty so
that proposers earn more income than responders on average. The idea is that while proposers
are allowed to announce a split, the role of the responders is restricted to accepting or rejecting
offers without having the opportunity to make counter-offers (GÜTH ET AL. (1982), KAGEL ET
AL. (1996)). Thus, the first-mover advantage may simply be measured by the difference in
incomes between proposers and responders in percent of the pie. Table 2 shows that this
advantage is dramatically increased in T1 and T2 (45.7% and 31.8% of the pie respectively)
compared to the control group with only 5.1%. The differences between treatments are analysed
in more detail next.– 10 –
Figure 1: Proposer Behaviour a) relative frequencies of offers across ranges of offers




































































control group treatment 1 treatment 2 Fig. 1a
control group treatment 1 treatment 2
£  5 13.0% 7.5% 19.0%
£  4 11.5% 9.0% 3.75%
£ 0.1 1.0% 26.0% 21.0%
Table 3: Frequencies of Focal Offers
4.1. Proposer Behaviour
Proposer behaviour can be analysed with respect to offer sizes and across rounds. When offers
are grouped in ranges, Figure 1a shows that in the control group the distribution is single-
peaked, and most offers (72%) fall in the two middle ranges of £3.1–4 and £4.1–5. In contrast,
in Treatments 1 and 2 most offers are in the lowest range of £0.1–1. Hence, there is a strong
tendency to make low offers in the two treatments. Both treatments, however, have a bimodal
distribution of offers across ranges in that there is a second peak in the range of „fair“ offers
(£4.1–5), which is stronger in T2 (see Fig. 1a).
The differences in offers across ranges are statistically significant between the control group
and the treatments (p < .01), and between treatments (p < .05) in the 
2 test. The tendency to
make lower offers in the treatments, but somewhat “fairer” offers in T2 than in T1 can also be
found when looking at the frequencies at which focal offers are made. Focal offers involve
values that are interpreted as behaviourally relevant in the literature. £5 is a focal offer because
it represents an equal split of the pie, and £0.1 represents the minimal feasible offer. £4 may be
a focal value because previous studies have shown that offers below 40% of the pie are often
rejected.
Table 3 gives the frequencies for these focal offers. In the control group offers of £4 and £5
are by far the most frequently offered values, while £0.1 is rarely offered. In contrast, the modal
offer in both treatments is £0.1, but in T2 £5 is offered almost equally often (see Tab. 3). Hence,
proposers in T2 tend to make either “fair” or “low” offers. Overall, proposers make much lower
offers to uninformed responders than to informed ones, even more so the less informed they are,
i.e. the less feedback responders receive.– 11 –
11Note that the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance is the generalization of the well-known Mann-Whitney
Test (for two independent samples) to k independent samples (see SIEGEL AND CASTELLAN, 1988).
12This difference is statistically significant at p < .01 in the Mann-Whitney Test. Also, differences in rejections are
significant at this level between the control group and T2 (but not between the control group and T1).
























































control group Fig. 2a
The finding that the proposers’ first mover advantage is strongly increased in the two
treatments (see Tab. 2) is largely a result of the much lower offers proposers make when facing
low information responders. This difference in proposer behaviour is also found when
comparing mean offers across rounds (see Fig. 1b). For the control group mean offers are
significantly higher across rounds than in the treatments (with an overall median of £4 compared
to a median of £2 in T1 and T2; see Tab. 2). Furthermore, in the treatments there is a tendency
to reduce offers over time that is not found for the control group. Again, this tendency is
somewhat stronger for T1, which indicates that proposers are ready to take advantage of the
ignorance of responders the less informed these are. The reported differences in offers across
rounds (see Fig. 1b) between the control group and the treatments, as well as between the two
treatments are highly significant in the Kruskal-Wallis Test (p < .01)
11.
4.2. Responder Behaviour
For the control group, responder behaviour in terms of the rejection rate of 26.5% corresponds
to what has been found in previous studies (see eg., ROTH ET AL., 1991, who report a mean rate
of 26.75% for four different countries). As for the offers, that remained almost constant across
rounds, there is no apparent trend in rejection rates over time (see Figure 2a).
In contrast, rejection rates decrease in the second half of the session in both treatments (see
Fig. 2b). Hence, after several rounds low information responders seem to have learned to choose
the option that yields positive payoffs. However, there is a systematic difference between the
two treatments in that responders with high feedback (T2) reject offers more often than those
under the low feedback condition (T1) after round 5.
12 While rejection rates in T1 are 10.5% on
average over the second 10 rounds, they are more than twice as high (25%) in T2 for this– 12 –
13Note that even in the last 5 rounds the average rejection rate is much higher in T2 (22%) than in T1 (10%).
period.
13 This indicates that the content of feedback strongly influences responder behaviour,
even though responders know how much they receive only after making their choice in each
round. These observations will be discussed in the next section.
5. Discussion
The results presented in the previous section will now be discussed with respect to the
hypotheses presented in Section 3 according to three observations that summarise the main
evidence from this experiment.
OBSERVATION 1:   Offers are systematically lower and the proposers’  first-mover
advantage is strongly increased when proposers face uninformed responders (T1, T2) compared
to responders under complete information (control group). However, offers are not minimal.
The evidence that proposers make much lower offers to uninformed responders than to
informed ones (see Fig. 1) – thereby increasing their income surplus towards the responders
from 5% of the pie in the control group to 46% in T1 and 32% in T2 (see Tab. 2) – demonstrates
that the average proposer is prepared to take advantage of his or her superior information.
Hence, in the present experiment there is not only a first-mover advantage, but also an
information advantage on the side of the proposers. Observation 1 clearly supports the CLA
hypothesis that a lack of structural information prevents from optimal play in terms of payoffs
compared to complete information.
More importantly, the observation is at odds not only with standard theory (that predicts
minimal offers), but also with the interpretation of fairness as an altruistic impulse, since the
latter would mean making similar offers to informed and uninformed responders. This is clearly
not the case so that this version of the fairness hypothesis is not supported by the data. 
The notion of “manners”, as CAMERER AND THALER (1995) have suggested, does not seem
to be convincing in the context of the present experiment either, because it is not obvious why
offering less to badly informed opponents should be in accordance with any “manners”. An
alternative interpretation that seems more in accordance with the present data would be that
proposers seek to maximise their own incomes, but strategically account for the veto power of
responders as a restriction to maximising. This interpretation, that may also explain why mean
offers stay well above the minimum, is discussed in more detail with regard to observation 2
next.– 13 –
14The term “strategic“ refers to behaviour that involves then anticipation of opponents‘ behaviour. Of course, in the
context of the present experiment, strategical behaviour in this sense involves some degree of identification with
the role as a proposer, since opponents are newly matched each round, and behaving strategically, thus, contributes
to a public good. However, it is known in the literature that subjects do – often unconsciously – identify with their
role and with fellow subjects in the same role (see HERTWIG AND ORTMANN, 1998), and subjects do contribute to
public goods in many experiments (see LEDYARD, 1995).
OBSERVATION 2: Proposers make lower offers to responders under low feedback (T1) than
to responders under high feedback (T2). – see Fig. 1.
Similar to observation 1, this observation supports a CLA hypothesis, namely that higher
feedback – that reveals more about the structure of the game or situation – fosters learning and
yields better outcomes (i.e., higher incomes) compared to lower feedback. This effect, however,
seems mainly due to the proposers’ anticipation of the responders’ situation. In the interpretation
given above – that proposers aim to maximise their incomes, but respect the responders’ veto
power – proposers strategically make one of the responders’ options, i.e., one arm of the bandit,
considerably more attractive than the other by offering clearly more than the minimal. Hence,
offering £0.1 makes the “accept” option not significantly more attractive than the “reject”
option, but mean offers above £2 may do so.
With regard to observation 2, this interpretation may also hold for responders with high
feedback (T2), since they learn each round how much the proposer received. Therefore,
proposers may feel that they must make the “accept” option even somewhat more attractive for
these responders. However, since responders learn the size of the amount they receive only after
choosing an option, offers do not have to be as high as under complete structural information in
the control group.
This type of reasoning may explain the differences in offers between the two feedback
conditions (observation 2), and between the treatments and the control group (observation 1) in
terms of strategic behaviour.
14 In contrast, the interpretation of proposer behaviour in terms of
“manners” is not easy to sustain with regard to observation 2, since “unfairness” can be detected
in the high feedback condition (T2), but proposers nevertheless do not make substantially higher
offers in T2 than in T1 (however, much lower offers than in the control group). Furthermore,
observation 2 contrasts with standard theory, and with the interpretation of fairness as an
altruistic impulse.
OBSERVATION 3: Although rejection rates decrease as responders under low structural
information learn to play the two-armed bandit, a) rejection rates stay positive, and b) under
high feedback (T2) rejection rates are persistently higher than under low feedback conditions
(T1).– 14 –
15In probability matching tasks the outcomes of two (or more) options depend on stochastic processes that are not
influenced by the subjects’ behaviour. However, the probabilities for the two options to yield a rewarding payoff
are different (but fixed). For example, the option “left” returns a payoff x with probability 0.7 while “right” pays
x with probability 0.3. Experiments have shown that many subjects approximately match these probabilities in that
they choose “left” 70% of the time and “right” 30% of the time, instead of maximising their payoffs by always
choosing the better performing option. Possible interpretations are (i) that subjects do not believe that they are
facing truly random processes (therefore trying to find some pattern), (ii) that they believe that they can influence
probabilities, and/or (iii) that probabilities are not fixed because the environment is not stable.
This observation first shows that low information responders are indeed able to learn the
two-armed bandit, since one arm always yields some positive payoff, while the other always
returns zero. Any sensible learning theory would predict this finding. What remains to be
explained, however, is why rejection rates never go to zero even after responders may have
learned the functions of the arms (after 10 rounds, say), and why there is a difference between
the two feedback conditions. The answer is not straightforward, especially not for the low
feedback condition (T1). The following interpretations seem possible.
1) After having learned the functions of the options (i.e., the arms of the bandit), low
information responders may have been hoping for higher payoffs from the “accept” option by
sometimes choosing the “reject” option. Hence, although they did not know the exact structure
of the game, responders knew that they were in an interdependent situation, and, therefore, may
have tried to behave “strategically”.
2) Low information responders may not have believed that they were acting in a stable
environment. That is, responders may believe that the “reject” option not always returns zero,
and, therefore, sometimes tried this option (e.g., hoping to get some large payoff). This
interpretation seems appealing particularly with regard to T1 where responders could learn only
about the two options they faced, but not about the underlying structure of the game. Evidence
from psychological experiments on so-called probability matching tasks shows that people tend
to sometimes choose an option that has performed poorly in the past even after they have
learned that a better performing option exists (see VULKAN, 1996 for a survey). One
interpretation is that subjects choose the low performing option in order to gather information
about the current status of that option, because they believe that the structure of the situation or
game may not be stable and, therefore, change over time.
15
3) Payoffs from the “accept” option were, at least sometimes, so low that responders did not
sytematically distinguish between the two options, therefore sometimes choosing the “reject”
option. This hypothesis has been investigated by looking at the probability of choosing the
“reject” option after a “low” amount (of £1 or less) was experienced. A binominal test shows
that there is no statistically significant relationship between rejection behaviour in a given round– 15 –
16The test included both T1 and T2 for the last 10 rounds. The null hypothesis that rejections occurred with equal
probability after observing a small amount (# £1) and after observing another amount could not be rejected. The
test is also not significant for all rounds and amounts # £2.
and the amount observed in the previous round so that this interpretation is not supported by the
data.
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4) Considerations of fairness may have played a role for the rejections. This interpretation
cannot be ruled out completely, but seems less plausible for responders with low feedback (T1)
than those with high feedback (T2). Hence, since responders in the latter condition were allowed
to learn the effect of their behaviour on responders, they may have tried to “punish” low offers.
This interpretation, however, may seem less compelling than interpretation 1 („strategic“
behaviour), because the design of the experiment did not allow responders to see offers before
choosing an option. Therefore, responders could not discriminate between “fair” and low offers
before “punishing”. Also, since they were matched with a new player each round, they could not
“punish” certain opponents in later rounds. The possibility for some sort of “blind punishment”,
however, cannot be excluded.
Overall, the first two interpretations discussed above may seem most convincing. They are
not mutually exclusive and both involve evolutionary arguments. Hence, trying to behave
strategically in a situation that is framed as a “game” is likely to be a heuristic learnt outside the
laboratory in game-like situations where strategic behaviour pays off. The heuristic may say
something like “try something else and see how the opponents react”. This may explain why the
rejection rates were higher for those responders with high feedback (T2) who knew more about
the structure of the game, i.e. who knew that there was a fixed amount to be split, and may have
tried to influence that split. The second argument is also of evolutionary nature since checking
occasionally on the actual state of an option that performed poorly in the past may be a strategy
or heuristic shaped by evolution in a world that is not stable (“check again later”). This may
well explain why the rejection rates are not zero even under low feedback (T1) after 20 rounds.
6. Conclusions
In sum, the present study allows for several conclusions. First, with respect to learning
behaviour the results show that people are able to adopt to situations of low structural
information. In the present design, however, this lack of information cannot be overcome
completely so that low information players suffer from the informational deficiency in terms of
payoffs. The extent to which this is the case, however, crucially depends on the learning
conditions, namely on the content of feedback. Hence, this study nicely demonstrates the
importance of this content and presents a case where missing structural information can, to some
extent, be replaced by feedback. – Furthermore, it has been argued from a more psychological– 16 –
perspective that individuals may use general heuristics like “try something else and see what the
opponent does” or “check again later” when learning to cope with a situation of low (structural)
information. Both heuristics may be interpreted as part of an ongoing information gathering
processes, that has been shaped by everyday experience or evolution.
Second, with respect to fairness behaviour this study presents evidence that subjects
(proposers) are willing to exploit their informational advantage. This seems at odds with
common notions of fairness or “manners”. In addition, the lower the information of their
opponents, the more are subjects willing to take their advantage. This finding has been
interpreted to be supportive for the view that responders may be less concerned with fairness,
but more with strategy in the sense discussed above. Therefore, evidence form the present study
seems to suggest that at least part of the “fairness” usually observed in ultimatum bargaining
may well result from strategic considerations (that account for the veto power of the
responders).– 17 –
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Appendix: Instructions and Player Screens
• Control Group
Note: Instructions are identical for both types of players to ensure that all subjects
understand both roles equally well. Only after the instructions, the computer randomly
assigned the subjects to their respective roles as proposers and responders (see screen 3).
Thereafter, these roles were fixed throughout the session.
• Treatment 1 and 2
Note: Instructions and player screens are identical for both treatments except for differences
indicated in the boxed text.
Bold and underlined text appeared in special colours on screens.
Options are shown in <brackets>.Appendix                                                                                     Instructions and Player Screens: Control Group – 20 –
Screen 1 for all players
Welcome!
Today you will have the opportunity to participate in a decision making experiment. If
you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, there will be an
opportunity for you to earn money during the session.
The Rules of the Game
•The session consists of 20 rounds.
•In each round two players are matched randomly, i.e. you will play with a new player
in each round.
In each round the two players face the following task:
First, player 1 decides how to split the amount of £10 between him or her and player 2.
•The amount player 1 wants to give to player 2 is called an offer.
•The offer can be any amount between £9.90 (highest possible offer) and £0.10
(lowest possible offer), in increments of £0.10.
•That is, player 1's offer can be £9.90, £9.80, £9.70......£0.30, £0.20, or £0.10.
•In each round player 1 can choose a new offer that may be identical to or different
from  previous offer(s).
•The offer is transmitted to player 2 via the computer, and player 1 will see how
player 2 reacted before the next round begins (see next).
Second, player 2 has to decide whether to accept or reject player 1's offer.
•If player 2 accepts the offer, player 2 receives the amount offered, and player 1
receives £10 minus the offer. 
Example: If the offer is £X.XX, and player 2 accepts it, player 2 receives
£X.XX and player 1 receives £10 – £X.XX.
•If player 2 rejects the offer, both players receive £0 (zero) in this round.
Third, both players are informed about how much they and the other player earned in
that round.
These three steps are identical in all 20 rounds.
These instructions can be accessed any time during the session by clicking on the
<Help> button.
<OK, I understand. Please continue with the instructions>Appendix                                                                                     Instructions and Player Screens: Control Group – 21 –
Screen 2 for all players
Please note
•Each round is new and independent of other rounds. 
 That is, 
-you are matched with a new player in each round.
-in each round there is a new £10 to be split.
•You will be assigned randomly to be either in the role of player 1 or player 2.
•You will keep that role throughout the session, i.e. in all 20 rounds.
Method of Payments
•At the end of this session 2 rounds from the 20 rounds played by each player will
randomly be selected. 
•The cash value earned in these two rounds will be paid to each player in addition to the
£5 for participating.
Final Comment
•You play completely anonymously. Neither the experimenter nor the other participants
in this experiment will know your identity, or how you behaved in this experiment.
•What you earn is your own business.
<scroll back to previous screen> <continue>
Screen 3 for all players
The computer will now decide randomly if you are player 1 or player 2.
You are player “ 1 / 2    ”  throughout this session, i.e. in all 20 rounds.
<continue>Appendix                                                                                     Instructions and Player Screens: Control Group – 22 –
Player Screen for Player 1
Round # (1-20)
You are payer 1.
Please choose the amount you want to offer to player 2 out of £10.
Please recall that you will receive £10 minus your offer if the offer is accepted, and
player 2 will receive your offer. If your offer is rejected both of you will receive £0.
Your offer must be in increments of £0.10.
I want to offer “    x.y0      ” £ to player 2.
<Confirm> <Change>
Player Screen for Player 2
Round # (1-20)
You are player 2.
The amount player 1 offers to you is “          ”£ out of £10.
<I accept> <I reject>
<Confirm> <Change>
Feedback Screen  for Player 1
Round # (1-20)
Player has decided to “accept”/”reject” your offer of “     ” £.
You earned “      ”£ in this round.
Player 2 earned “      ”£ in this round.
Please prepare for the next round.
<continue> <help>
Feedback Screen for Player 2
Round # (1-20)
You have decided to “accept”/”reject” the offer of “     ” £.
You earned “       ”£ in this round.
Player 1 earned “       ”£ in this round
Please prepare for the next round.
<continue> <help>Appendix                                                                                Instructions and Player Screens: Treatments 1 & 2 – 23 –
Third, you are informed about player 2’s
choice, and how much you earned in this
round.
Player 2 is ONLY informed about how
much he earned in this round, but NOT
how much YOU earned.
Third, you are informed about player 2’s
choice, and how much you earned in this
round.
Player 2 is informed about how much he
earned this round, and ALSO how much
YOU earned.
Screen 1 for players 1
Welcome!
Today you will have the opportunity to participate in a decision making experiment. If you
follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, there will be an opportunity for you
to earn money during the session.
The Rules of the Game
•The session consists of 20 rounds, each of which is played by two players.
•You are player 1 throughout the session, and you will be matched each round with a new player
2.
In each round the two players face the following task:
First, you (player 1) decide how to split the amount of £10 between you and player 2.
•The amount you want to give to player 2 is called an offer.
•The offer can be any amount between £9.90 (highest possible offer) and £0.10 (lowest
possible offer), in increments of £0.10.
•That is, your offer can be £9.90, £9.80, £9.70......£0.30, £0.20, or £0.10.
•In each round you can choose a new offer that may be identical to or different from
previous offer(s).
•The offer is transmitted to player 2 via the computer, and you will see how player 2 reacted
to your offer before the next round begins (see next).
Second, player 2  reacts to your offer by pressing one of two buttons labeled “left” and “right”.
•Player 2 sees only these two buttons on his screen, and has no information about you
making an offer, nor about the size of your offer.
•By pressing one of buttons, player 2 accepts your offer, i.e. he receives the amount you
offered, and you receive £10 minus your offer in that round.
Example: If the offer is £X.XX, and player 2 accepts it, player 2 receives £X.XX
and you receive £10 – £X.XX.
•By pressing the other button, player 2 rejects your offer, and both of you receive £0 (zero)
in this round.
Text for Treatment 1     Text for Treatment 2
These three steps are identical in all 20 rounds.
These instructions can be accessed any time during the session by clicking on the <Help>
button.
<OK, I understand. Please continue with the instructions>Appendix                                                                                Instructions and Player Screens: Treatments 1 & 2 – 24 –
Screen 2 for players 1
Please note 
•Each round is new and independent of other rounds. 
 That is, 
-you are matched with a new player in each round.
-in each round there is a new £10 to be split.
Method of Payments
•At the end of this session 2 rounds from the 20 rounds played by each player will randomly be
selected. 
•The cash value earned in these two rounds will be paid to each player in addition to the £5 for
participating.
Final Comment
•You play completely anonymously. Neither the experimenter nor the other participants in this
experiment will know your identity, or how you behaved in this experiment.
•What you earn is your own business.
<scroll back to previous screen> <continue>Appendix                                                                                Instructions and Player Screens: Treatments 1 & 2 – 25 –
•The next screen will then show you the
amount you earned in this round.
•The next screen will then show you the
amount you earned in this round, and also
how much player 1 earned.
Screen 1 for players 2
Welcome!
Today you will have the opportunity to participate in a decision making experiment. If you
follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, there will be an opportunity for you
to earn money during the session.
The Rules of the Game
•The session consists of 20 rounds, each of which is played by two players.
•You are player 2 throughout the session, and you will be matched each round with a new player
1.
In each round you will see two buttons on your screen.
•The left button is labeled “left”.
•The right button is labeled “right”.
•You may choose to push either one of these buttons, and then confirm your choice by
pushing the “confirm” button at the bottom of the screen.
Text for Treatment 1   Text for Treatment 2
Please note 
•All 20 rounds are identical as described above.
•However, each round is independent of other rounds. 
 That is, you may freely choose to push the “left” or “right” button.
Method of Payments
•At the end of this session 2 rounds from the 20 rounds played by each player will randomly be
selected. 
•The cash value earned in these two rounds will be paid to each player in addition to the £5 for
participating.
Final Comment
•You play completely anonymously. Neither the experimenter nor the other participants in this
experiment will know your identity, or how you behaved in this experiment.
•What you earn is your own business.
These instructions can be accessed any time during the session by clicking on the <Help>
button.
<OK, I understand> <Help>Appendix                                                                                Instructions and Player Screens: Treatments 1 & 2 – 26 –
You earned “       ”£ in this round.
You earned “       ”£ in this round.
Player 1 earned “      ”£ in this round.
Player Screen for Player 1
Round # (1-20)
You are payer 1.
Please choose the amount you want to offer to player 2 out of £10.
Please recall that you will receive £10 minus your offer if the offer is accepted, and player 2 will
receive your offer. If your offer is rejected both of you will receive £0.
Your offer must be in increments of £0.10.
I want to offer “    x.y0      ” £ to player 2.
<Confirm> <Help>
Player Screen  for Player 2
Round # (1-20)
You are player 2.
Please choose “left” or “right” by clicking on the respective button.
<left> <right>
<confirm your choice> <help>
Feedback Screen for Player 1
Round # (1-20)
Player has decided to “accept”/”reject” your offer of “     ” £.
You earned “      ”£ in this round.
Player 2 earned “      ”£ in this round.
Please prepare for the next round.
<continue> <help>
Feedback Screen for Player 2
Round # (1-20)
You have chosen the “left” / “right” key.
Text for Treatment 1 Text for Treatment 2
Please prepare for the next round.
<continue> <help>